THE PARADOX OF SYSTEMIC ADVANTAGES: INDONESIA’S EXECUTIVE FLEXIBILITY AND JAPAN’S LEGISLATIVE STABILITY IN ASIAN POLITICAL DYNAMICS

Abstract

This study unravels the paradox behind two strengths of Asian governance systems that have long been taken for granted namely, the flexibility of Indonesia’s executive branch and the stability of Japan’s legislative branch by framing them not as permanent strengths but as sources of governance vulnerabilities that manifest in different ways. The study employs a qualitative approach through a literature review using the narrative literature review method as outlined by Creswell (2013), and is analyzed using David Easton’s political system theory framework, which traces the sequence of inputs, processes, outputs, and feedback in both governance systems. The results show that the flexibility of Indonesia’s executive branch is often hampered by party fragmentation in parliament despite the continuous raising of the parliamentary threshold, while Japan’s legislative stability built on the Liberal Democratic Party’s (LDP) sole dominance since 1955 proved fragile when the LDP-Komeito coalition lost its majority in the 2024 Lower House General Election in 2024 and the Upper House in 2025. Both systems share structural deficits: Indonesia faces inconsistencies in the pace of policymaking due to fragmentation, and Japan faces a lack of diversity in policy alternatives due to single-party dominance that is beginning to erode; therefore, strengthening governance requires functional checks and balances as well as inter-institutional collaboration that is not dependent on the dominance of a single political force.